Abstract. Telecommunication protocol standards have in the past and typically still use both an English description of the protocol (sometimes also followed with a behavioural SDL model) and an ASN.1 specification of the data-model, thus likely making the specification incomplete. ASN.1 is an ITU/ISO data definition language which has been developed to describe abstractly the values protocol data units can assume; this is of considerable interest for model checking as subtyping in ASN.1 can be used to constrain/construct the state space of the protocol accurately. However, with current practice, any change to the English description cannot easily be checked for consistency while protocols are being developed. In this work, we have developed a SPIN-based tool called EASN (Enhanced ASN.1) where the behaviour can be formally specified through a language based upon Promela for control structures but with data models from ASN.1. An attempt is also made to use international standards (X/Open std on ASN.1/C++ translation) as available so that the tool can be realised with pluggable components. One major design criterion is to enable incremental computation wherever possible (for example: hash values, consistency between alternate representations of state). We have used EASN to validate a simplified model of RLC (Radio Link Control) in the W-CDMA stack that imports datatypes from its associated ASN.1 model. In this paper, we discuss the motivation and design of the EASN language, the architecture and implementation of the verification tool for EASN and some preliminary performance indicators.
Introduction
Next generation protocols for mobile devices have become very complex and it is becoming increasingly difficult for standards bodies to be sure of the correctness of protocols during the standardization process. This has become an impediment in defining new standards. What one needs is a way of specifying a protocol and have some confidence that, at a certain level of abstraction, the protocol is consistent in spite of modifications.
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There are languages like Promela that can be used, but their data structuring capabilities do not match those that are used in telecommunication protocols. ASN.1 [6] (Abstract Syntax Notation One) is a widely used data definition language in telecommunication protocol specification. It will help the standardization process if a model checker could be augmented with ASN.1 data modelling capabilities to check correctness of interim versions of a protocol before establishing a standard. Inspite of prototypes that are built, they often cannot exercise all aspects of a protocol, especially those that are evolving.
In addition, due to the presence of the subtyping mechanism in ASN.1, model checking can be more effective as unreachable parts of the state space that could be introduced in simpler data models in other languages need not be considered.
Hence, we have designed an Enhanced ASN.1 language, EASN, that combines the control structures of Promela with the data definition capabilities of ASN.1. We present our verification tool for EASN and its architecture. We derive our implementation from SPIN, to benefit from its many capabilities.
Why ASN.1?
ASN.1 separates data modelling into abstract and transfer syntax. The abstract syntax only specifies the universe of abstract values that can be assumed by variables in the model without any concern for how they are mapped to a particular machine, compiler, OS, etc. Hence from the point of view of model checking, an abstract syntax constrains the state space as much as possible if there is a mechanism by which a system state vector can be encoded with exactly only the possible values of its constituent substates. The latter is a chief feature of the state compaction infrastructure that has been developed for EASN. This is equivalent to model checking with abstract data models that does not require examining unreachable parts of the system state space introduced due to lack of subtyping, etc. We primarily exploit ASN.1's subtyping feature which is a well developed notation for expressing constraints. Note that data here actually means the control data in the protocols and hence our concerns are different from those approaches that exploit symmetry, etc. While TTCN, the test language in ISO/ITU communities, uses ASN.1, our attempt is to marry ASN.1 with a well known model checker such as SPIN.
Why SPIN?
SPIN is an effective model checking tool for asynchronous systems, especially designed for communication protocols. The design of control constructs in Promela has been based upon those in SDL, a language that has been used to specify communication protocols since '70s. Nondeterminism and guarded commands in Promela makes it convenient to express behavior of communicating protocol entities. The model checking system SPIN [1] , which uses Promela, has many capabilities like deadlock detection, validating invariants or assertions, detecting non-progress cycles and livelocks, and establishing LTL properties. Algorithms that effect substantial space and time savings, like bit-state hashing, on-the-fly model-checking and partial-order reduction have been incorporated into SPIN. Hence, modifying the SPIN system to handle ASN.1 has been a design goal.
SPIN has a simulator that randomly checks only a portion of the state space and also a (generated) validator that can attempt to exhaustively check the state space of the system or can use techniques like bit-state hashing to check a substantial portion of the state space with a fairly high level of assurance. Our EASN system also has these components.
One major design criterion for EASN is to enable incremental computation wherever possible (for example: hash values, consistency between alternate representations of state). SPIN, however, does not do such incremental computation but is still faster for other reasons (see section 5).
EASN Language
ASN.1 can be used to define the datatypes and constant values in an application. Promela, however, is a complete language with a set of basic data types and typedef construct to help users compose datatypes, and a set of control constructs that can be used to define the behaviour of protocol entities.
The EASN Language replaces all the datatyping capabilities of Promela with ASN.1. Hence, none of the data types of Promela are retained in EASN, except the chan construct. Thus basic datatypes of Promela, namely, bit, bool, char, short and int, as well as related constructs, unsigned, bitfields, typedef and the mtype declaration are not part of EASN. Channel definition syntax and the capability of defining arrays of channels is retained as there is no similar construct in ASN.1. Defining arrays of other types through the same syntax is, however, disallowed in EASN (as the sequence-of construct in ASN.1 can be used). The subset of the ASN.1 Language that is incorporated into EASN is detailed in [12] .
As ASN.1 has richer and more expressive datatypes compared to Promela, EASN needs to overload the semantics of many of the operators of Promela, so as to support a natural set of operations on data. In addition, we have also augmented the set of operators as necessary. In the first version of the language and implementation, only such operator overloadings and new operators have been included as are necessary for functional completeness. Briefly [12] , therefore, EASN = Promela -{mtype, typedef, bit, byte, bool, short, int, unsigned} + ASN.1 + appropriately overloaded semantics of the existing operators + few new operators.
Related Work
One interesting work relating to language design and protocol verification using the SPIN infrastructure is that of Promela++ at Cornell University [10] . Additions to the Promela language were made to make the resulting language suitable for expressing user level network protocols for high performance computing. If Promela++ is compiled with the verification option, it can do model checking. If compiled with the code option, just like YACC, it produces protocol code using 'actions'. However, the 'actions' are not subject to verification through the SPIN system as they are in C.
SPIN does various kinds of state compaction and, in EASN, we have a comparable mechanism for most of them that perform at least as well in space. But some are unnecessary in EASN. Geldenhuys and Villiers [9] also attempt state compression in SPIN along similar lines as ours but by adding a simple construct to the Promela Language in an ad hoc fashion with restrictions. For example, different orders of process activation along different execution paths are forbidden in their approach. Also, their variable's ranges must start at zero. We do not have such restrictions.
Outline of Paper
In section 2, we give a brief overview of our EASN system. Later sections present more details of each subsystem. The section 4 discusses the relevant aspects of the SPIN implementation necessary to understand our modifications and then discusses the EASN implementation in some detail. The last section presents example runs in both EASN and SPIN and performance indicators. Finally, we end with conclusions and future work.
EASN, the Verification Tool

Encoding State Efficiently
SPIN represents state quite efficiently but, for reasons of alignment, etc, allows padding and other extraneous matter in the state vector. Since our system uses ASN.1 data models, we can require that all variables be as constrained as possible in the space of values that they can take through the use of subtyping. For example, if an integer variable takes values from 8..15 only, we can represent the state of that variable in 3 bits. Further, if there are only two variables that are constrained to be between, say, 5..7 and 3..7, there are only 15 possibilities and both can be represented in only 4 bits instead of either 2+3 (5 bits) or worse 3+3 (6 bits) 1 . Similarly, if an ASN.1 datatype assumes only integer values 5, 7, 11 and 13, only 2 bits of space is needed in the linearised state-vector for objects of this type.
Our design for EASN, therefore, has a critical facility called the state compaction infrastructure that views the state space of the system as a multidimensional array (with one dimension for every component of the state of EASN), and consequently, every state of the system, as a point in this multidimensional space. We use a column-major linearisation that additionally enables incremental computation of state hash values (see section 4.4). Note that a rowmajor linearisation is not helpful in this regard as the number of components that comprise the system keeps going up and down as the system evolves.
Outline of EASN System Design
Given the EASN language, one can now specify all the aspects of a protocol formally (instead of a mixture of English and ASN.1): the structure of the protocol data units (PDUs) and the behavior of the protocol entities. This enables us to to identify inconsistencies and incorrect, unintended and unwanted behaviors in the system if we have a verification tool for EASN with capabilities similar to that in SPIN.
Given that the EASN language is derived from Promela, can one realise a verification tool for EASN through modifications to the SPIN system? However, we need then to worry about modifiability, maintainability, upgradability, or just even maturing over a period of time, given that ASN.1, Promela and SPIN are all live, evolving pieces of work, and have matured over long periods of time.
We see three main issues: how to avoid the cost of processing of a very large language like ASN.1, current non-availability of a complete toolset for ASN.1 and how to insulate oneself from the evolution of SPIN. We discuss them below. [7] to architect the tool so as to enable other users besides us and NRC to realise it by plugging in any compliant ASN.1/C++ translator into the system (Figure 1 ).Since BEX is not completely conformant to the accepted standard, there is a need to adapt the BEX-generated C++ to requirements of the parser and simulator modules. This requirement is encapsulated into a thin layer of software that enables these modules to use BEX generated C++ source. Changes in SPIN: All our modifications to the SPIN sources are encapsulated in pre-processor conditional compilation flags. This enables us to incorporate any incremental change / bug-fix to SPIN quite easily and fast into EASN.
EASN Modules
An EASN system specification (to be simulated/verified) consists of two compilation units. One contains all the ASN.1 modules (the dEASN spec.) that is parsed by the translator to generate the C++ source. The other compilation unit contains the behavioural specification of the protocol entities (the cEASN spec.) that is parsed by the EASN parser (a modified Promela parser, derived from SPIN). It is the variable declarations in the cEASN spec that ties it to the dEASN spec as their types are defined in the ASN.1 modules. The EASN parser imports all the relevant information regarding a type, from the generated C++ source, by querying its meta-data interface into the internal symbol-tables of EASN.
The EASN Simulator:
The EASN simulator (a modified Promela simulator, derived from SPIN, section 1.2), besides requiring the information generated by the parser, requires to access data values and modify them through permitted operations. However, since the simulator engine has no knowledge of the specific ASN.1 types that might be used in different EASN specifications, these data operations must be carried out using the ASN.1/C++ generic data interface that supports operations on objects of types a priori unknown. The ASN.1/C++ translator exports such a complete functional interface to access the values held in objects of ASN.1 types.
The EASN Validator: SPIN, and EASN too, generates a set of files pan.
[chmtb] that are compiled together into a model checking executable (section 1.2). Some of these files, for example .h file, define structures corresponding to the various proctypes and queues that comprise the system, and the state structure. Components of these structures, together, form the state of the system being analysed. We shall refer to the state of the system as the state of SPIN to differentiate it from what we shall later call the state of EASN.
The state of SPIN is kept in one place in memory, but two sections of code in the generated pan files view it differently. The code in pan.
[mb] corresponds to the transitions that take the system from one state to another, in the forward and backward directions respectively. This code views groups of components in a structured manner, either as some process or queue structure, or some globalvariable. However, the code in pan.c that has to do with constructing, modifying, maintaining, storing state (into the hash table / or on stack) and comparing for equality views the very same state of SPIN as a block of memory without any further structure. This makes for a highly optimised implementation of the SPIN validator but, in the context of EASN, where most of the components of the state of EASN are C++ objects, this two-views-of-the-same-memory is problematic.
The state of EASN, therefore, is organised differently. We encapsulate every actual component of the state inside an object of type MSVComponent (Minimal-State-Vector-Component, a C++ template type). The state of EASN, then, is simply an array of such encapsulated objects. This representation of the state of EASN is useful for code in pan. [mb] . Since the state manipulating code in pan.c needs to view the state as a contiguous chunk of memory, we also maintain a consistent, linearised representation of the state of EASN. The consistency is guaranteed by the functionality of the encapsulating class.
In order to play its role, the encapsulating class needs to know some information regarding the type of the object that it encapsulates. This information, for every type, is made available through a function call interface in the state compaction information module that is automatically generated by a compaction information generator (figure 1). Further details are available in Section 4.3.
EASN System from an User Perspective
The user first uses an available ASN.1/C++ translator that conforms to the NMF standards to generate C++ source corresponding to all the ASN.1 modules that together form the dEASN spec. This generated C++ source, containing both the generic/specific data interfaces and the metadata interface, is then compiled to create (say) asn1 link modules. This C++ source comprises of header (include) files, their implementation, and some tool-provided run-time support. The header files are included in the EASN source which is compiled to generate its set of link modules. These link modules are then linked with the asn1 link modules to generate the EASN (executable) tool. Generated C++ source is compiled into the executable that processes the cEASN spec corresponding to the dEASN spec used to generate it. The EASN system then parses the cEASN spec and uses the metadata interface to validate the types of variables instantiated, their usage in expressions, their compatibility with various operators, and such, to ultimately generate the parse tree and symbol table data structures. This completes the role of the parser. The GUI can be used to choose to either simulate the system or to generate pan (the protocol-analyser).
The simulator module makes calls to the generic interface and some components of the specific interface (only those that export the data access services corresponding to the basic data types of ASN.1). If the user chooses to generate the validator instead, the validator-generator takes control and generates C++ source in the pan.
[hcmbt] files, similar to SPIN. An additional intermediate step requires that another program called the Compaction Information Generator (cigen, for short), using the metadata interface generated by the ASN.1/C++ translator, generates the Compaction Information that has to be linked with the pan files. Finally, all this generated source has to be compiled and linked with the asn1 link modules, and with the new (l)svcomp ((light-) State Vector Component) module, to generate the pan.
ASN.1 to C++ Translation
NMF (Network Management Forum 1998) has an "ASN.1/C++ Application Programming Interface" [7] set of standards that give C++ bindings to ASN.1 types. The standard is briefly discussed here. It has two parts, namely, Part 1: Base Classes and Specific Interface and Part 2: Generic Interface.
The C++ Data Model for ASN.1
Corresponding to every ASN.1 module definition, a C++ namespace is instantiated containing a C++ class definition generated for every type in that module. The public interface for the predefined C++ Classes corresponding to all the basic types of ASN.1 is defined to be in the 'ASN1' namespace. All predefined and generated C++ classes are derived from a fundamental Abstract Class called ASN1::AbstractData. Also, for each ASN.1 constant, a C++ object of that type is instantiated. The syntactic name-mangling rules to generate the appropriate C++ names for the corresponding ASN.1 names are simple.
In addition, for each ASN.1 type, a C++ class is also created to export (though its public interface) meta-data regarding the properties of that type. Such class definitions corresponding to the basic types already exist in the ASN1 namespace. These classes and all classes that are defined corresponding to the various user-defined ASN.1 types are public subclasses of an abstract class called ASN1::AbstractType.
Part 1: Base Classes and Specific Interface
This part defines the C++ classes corresponding to all the basic datatypes in ASN.1 and also the rules followed to generate C++ code for user-defined types in the ASN.1 module(s) using compositional constructs of ASN.1 and the subtyping mechanism. In the generated C++ code, public access methods for every component of the SEQUENCE, CHOICE, and SET type are included. The names of these methods are chosen by name mangling those of the corresponding components in the ASN.1 module specification. This interface, called the specific data interface, is exported by the generated classes for the corresponding SEQUENCE, SET and CHOICE type definitions given in the ASN.1 module.
Part 2: Generic Interface
This part defines the metadata interface as well as the generic data interface. For instance, a C++ interface for querying the metadata of ASN.1 types, methods to get the (names of the) enumerators of an ENUMERATED type or those to get the (names of) components of a SEQUENCE type. Querying through this interface could retrieve all the necessary information to enable parsing EASN code that defines variables of ASN.1 types and operates upon them.
The definition of the Generic Data Interface involves exporting a functionally complete interface that can be used to access the values held in objects of arbitrary type confirming to the data model. This interface, for instance, defines C++ classes like CHOICE and StructuredData which provide generic methods to access the components of a CHOICE, SEQUENCE or SET object. These methods take the component name as the (string) parameter to provide access to the corresponding component. The EASN Simulator module uses this generic data interface, along with the metadata interface, to discover the structure of datatypes and operate on objects of these types.
EASN System: Implementation
We shall now move over to discussing the implementation of the EASN System. We shall begin by discussing the implementation of the SPIN System as a set of sub-systems: here we use the word sub-system to identify either a set of C-modules, or sometimes a single C-module, or even just a set of functions / functionality within a C-module. We then talk about the details of our implementation, with respect to the SPIN description below.
SPIN and Its Subsystems[8]
SPIN is implemented, mostly, in ANSI C. It, therefore, comprises of various include files and link modules. Apart from C, there is (only) the GUI module that is entirely implemented in the Tcl/Tk scripting language. One of our primary tasks, before attempting any modifications to SPIN, was to come up with an abstract view of the SPIN sources that would make it possible to break down our implementation effort into a set of well-defined subtasks, that we could then attempt systematically. Recall from section 2.2, that our implementation of EASN from SPIN was to retain all the good features of SPIN, and also be able to upgrade to future releases of SPIN, with minimal effort 2 . Below, we list the main components of the SPIN system, from the perspective of a designer wishing to modify SPIN. GUI: This module is implemented in Tcl/Tk entirely, and requires only cosmetic changes when having to function in the context of EASN. Parser: This module comprises of a handcrafted lexer and a YACC-generated Promela parser, along with the necessary supporting functionality in associated link modules. Like for all languages, the parser parses the input specification, checks for syntactic correctness, and creates internal data structures that capture all the relevant information from the specification to enable either simulation of the system specified, or generation of a validator for it. This was the starting point for our modifications, since we had a clear set of requirements in the form of an EASN language spec, drawn out as a set of modifications to Promela.
2 A good indication that we have met this design goal is that while we began making our modifications to SPIN version 2.5.4, by the time we could get EASN to its current state, we had gone through 4 'upgrading's and at the time of making this release, we are in sync with its version 3.4.1.
Parse tree and symbol table:
This module includes the various data structures defined in the spin.h file, and the supporting functionality provided in various other link modules. The definitions for some of the data structures involved were slightly modified to reflect the change in the data model of EASN with respect to that of Promela.
Simulator: This module includes all the code that operates upon the fully constructed parse tree and the completely populated symbol table. Its role is to effect a random walk on the reachable state space of the specified system, starting at the initial state. One of the key functions is the recursive eval function. Given a node of the parse tree, it returns an integer value on evaluating the expression tree rooted at it, since any basic type in Promela is representable in a 32-bit integer, a key design decision in the SPIN implementation. (Similarly, all objects of higher-order types are also represented, passed as parameters to processes (at their initialisation), or passed into and out of message channels, as a collection of the required number of integer objects). In EASN, our major modification to this module stems from our need to change the function call interface of eval.
Validator-Generator:
The starting point for this subsystem, similar to the simulator described above, is the information in the parse-tree and the associated symbol-table. It comprises of all the files that begin with the pangen prefix. This module generates the pan (protocol analyser) files in ANSI C. The generated files (described below) are then compiled together to form the executable protocolanalyser that actually analyses the Promela spec. Protocol-Analyser: This program conducts a search over the reachable state space of the system described in the Promela spec, using a user-configured combination of algorithmic components. The basic state space search algorithmic framework remains broadly the same; however, intermediate steps, like whether to use partial-order reduction methods, whether to use complete state storage or bit-state hashing, whether to incorporate fairness, safety properties, acceptance cycles, etc. are user provided inputs that are used to select the code fragments that compose the complete search loop. The entire program is one single C compilation-unit, with the rest of the files mentioned below, being #included into the pan.c file. pan.h: This file declares forward prototypes of certain functions that are defined in the pan.c files, but may be used before they are defined. More importantly, the structures corresponding to the state of the system (including those of various proctypes and channels defined in the Promela spec) are also defined. For instance, when the Promela spec has a (system-) global or a (proctype-)local variable declaration, the generated pan.h file has a member variable (with the same name) of the corresponding C type in the state structure, or in the proctype structure. In EASN, the structure corresponding to these various proctypes, channels, and the state of the system are defined differently. Also, the prototypes of certain functionality had to be changed. pan.m: This file contains, as a single list of case options, C statements corresponding to every state transition (move) in the input Promela spec. Transitions in this file take the system forward in its search. All of this file is #included as the body of a C switch statement. For instance, an original Promela statement that, say, increments a certain (proctype-)local variable is translated into a case entry in this file that is a C expression incrementing the value of the corresponding proctype member variable. However, just before incrementing, the value of the variable is copied into a stack trace. (The next item illustrates the use of the stack-trace). In EASN, the contents of this generated file continue to remain the same. However, since we import the support for operating with ASN.1/C++ Objects from the C++ bindings, where any access to some component of a structured object requires us to make a function call, it looks slightly different. pan.b: Similar to the pan.m file, this file is also a single list of case options with one case listed here for every case in the file above. Each case body expects, at the top of the stack trace, the information that it needs to restore the state of the system to the point earlier, before the corresponding case took it forward. This file, therefore, contains all the code that takes the system backward from where it is to where it was, before it chose any particular forward move from the pan.m file. The stack trace, then, is the information that is generated by the cases in the pan.m file, and consumed by the code in the pan.b file. In EASN, just like for the previous file, the corresponding pan.b file needs to work with C++ objects imported from the ASN.1/C++ translation and is therefore different to that extent. pan.t: The code in this file contains the functionality that generates the transition matrix that encodes the behavioral semantics of the system. These transition objects refer to the case labels that identify the cases in the pan.
[mb] files above. The various members of the transition structure are used by the policy code (below). EASN does not modify either the definition of the transition or the way transition objects are created and populated by this pan.t code.
State-of-SPIN:
We refer to the now object of type State (whose structure is defined in the pan.h file), with all the process and queue objects overlaid onto it, as the State-of-SPIN. Some members of the State structure are book keeping information that is used by the policy code in pan.c to make decisions when conducting the search. As and when processes and queues are created in the system, space is allocated for them so as to overlay them on the unused trailing portion of now. Also, as and when queues become inaccessible or processes reach the end of their computation and therefore can be flushed out of the system, the space that they occupy is recovered but in a strict last-in-first-out fashion. The various functions defined in the pan.c file that compress (or compact) now, put it into the hash- 
EASN and Its Subsystems
EASN has all the modules of SPIN listed above and a few more (see figure 1) . Those SPIN modules that are modified in EASN are described only to the extent to which they differ. Sub-systems of SPIN that are not modified in EASN are not included below, for example, the GUI part, and the pan.t file. Except for our choice to change the representation of the state of the generated validator, the major change in EASN from SPIN is the type system. Hence, in the implementation of EASN, this should translate into modifications to SPIN wherever it deals with variables (and expressions involving variables). Therefore, entire pieces of code that have to do with the handling the semantics of the control constructs of Promela need not be modified at all. Parser: The lexer has been modified to modify the set of keywords in the language, to recognise the ASN.1 value-notation for constant values and to identify ASN.1 type-references and value-references. On encountering an ASN.1 typename, the parser queries the ASN.1 metadata interface for the complete set of attributes associated with that type and updates its symbol table accordingly. Notice, therefore, that only those types from the ASN.1 module that are actually referred in the cEASN spec, are actually imported into the symbol table. Parse tree and symbol table: The definitions of the structures of some of the types that build the symbol table and the expression tree in the parse tree have been modified. For instance, the optionality and the default value attributes of the component of structured types need to be represented in the Symbol structure. Similarly, in order to enable the compatibility check for operators and operands, the Lextok structure has been enhanced.
Simulator: One of our modifications to this subsystem is to the eval function that evaluates an expression in the given state of the system. In EASN, this function returns a dynamically allocated object of type AbstractData. This makes it convenient to implement the operand type upgrade associated with some of the overloaded operators. Another modification has to do with passing parameters to process invocations, or passing messages through channels using send and recv operators. In EASN, since the C++ types that are referred through their ASN.1 names are already compiled into the (simulator) application, entire C++ objects can be handled without, as in SPIN, having to compute the number of integer objects required to represent types, whose objects need to be passed as parameters (while invoking process instances), or through channels. Validator-Generator: EASN also generates all the files that SPIN does, and at the level of abstraction in the previous section, the contents of the EASN generated pan files are similar too. We discuss the details below. Protocol-Analyser: The SPIN generated pan files are complete in so far as they do not need to link with anything more than the standard C Library. EASN generated files, however, need to link with run time support, ASN.1 support, state vector component support, GNU multi-precision arithmetic, and the compaction information. All of these are linked together to produce pan.
State-of-EASN:
The now object in SPIN generated validators encapsulates the State-of-SPIN. As presented in the section on SPIN, the code in the pan.
[mb] files deals with the structured objects that overlay onto now (and the other members of the State structure that correspond to global variables in the Promela spec). Whereas the policy code from pan.c uses the book-keeping information to store the state of the search, the mechanisms code views now merely as a sequence of contiguous bytes. This 'multiple-views-of-a-single-chunk-of-memory' tends to become unmanageable in the context of EASN, where the objects that comprise the state of the system are C++ objects that can have virtual-table pointers, RTTI, and other inaccessible private components. The State-of-EASN, therefore has two representations: one which lends itself to be used by structured users such as the code in the pan.
[mb] files and the policy code, and the other, the linearised version, which is intended for use by the mechanisms code. By ensuring that these two representations are mutually consistent but only at points where the control changes from the structured-view code to the linearised-view code, we benefit by implementing incrementally both the consistency updates as well as the computation of the hash-values for the linearised versions. Consequently, the mechanisms code in the EASN generated analysers is simpler than for SPIN. svcomp-Module: In EASN, the consistency between the two representations discussed above is achieved by encapsulating every component of the State-of-EASN into (a publicly derived subclass of) the MSVComponent (Minimal-StateVector-Component) template class whose functionality incrementally ensures consistency. We call this facility the compaction infrastructure. In order for the MSVComponent class to execute its responsibility, it requires to know, for every type that it encapsulates: the cardinality c of the value-set represented by the type, and a mapping from this value-set onto integers in the range: 0..c. This information is required to be available through a function-call interface. If the value of c for every type that is imported from ASN.1 is representable using 32-bit integers, then a more efficient implementation of this module called lsvcomp (light-svcomp) can be used instead. The call interface is: MP INT * EASN GetCardinality (Type *), that returns the cardinality, and MP INT * EASN GetIndex (Type * object), that returns the index of the value in the value-set. This module uses the GNU Multi-Precision (GMP) package. The MP INT type in the prototypes above is exported by this GMP library. In case of the lsvcomp module, the return types for the above functions is mp limb t. cigen: This sub-system generates the implementation for the two functions described above for every type in the ASN.1 module. In our current implementation, it has been implemented as a stand-alone tool that uses the metadata interface to generate these functions for all the types in the ASN.1 module definition, but it could also be implemented as an additional link module of the EASN system, thereby generating the compaction information only for those types from the ASN.1 module that are imported into the cEASN Spec. Compaction-information: This is the set of functions that are generated by the cigen utility above needs to link into pan. panrts-module: This module is required because of the automatic type upgrading semantics of some of the operands of EASN. Also, there is a gap between the set of operations that are supported by the C++ classes corresponding to the basic datatypes of ASN.1 and the operators that we support on them in our EASN Language definition. This module bridges the gap. pan.h: The structures defined in this file are similar to those of SPIN, except that members of the structures that actually correspond to variables in the cEASN spec are encapsulated into the MSVComponent class (or one of its subclasses). For instance, if the finite state automaton corresponding to a proctype has 19 local states, in the SPIN generated pan.h file, the corresponding structure has a member, which identifies the state a particular process, of type char to store this information. EASN generates, for the same purpose, a member with type iSVComponent<20>. Similarly, an cEASN variable of type asn::Integer causes the generated pan.h file to have the type of the corresponding member variable to be SVComponent<asn::Integer>. pan.c-mechanisms: The entire set of these mechanisms that work with the linearised view of the state of the system have been re-implemented in EASN. For instance, the default compression algorithm used in SPIN pan is unnecessary for linearised versions of the State-of-EASN. As another example, consider the implementation of the hash compact version of the compression routine in SPIN pan. It computes the compressed version of every process and queue state in the system separately from the global state of the system and individually hashes these to generate much smaller id's which are then used to compose a new (far shorter) representation of the reached-state, which is stored into the hash table. This two-level hashing is implemented incrementally by recording the necessary book-keeping information in the compaction infrastructure, when installing and uninstalling components of the State-of-EASN. Contiguous subsets of these system components are demarcated as belonging to either the global state, or of a particular process or queue and separate linearisations for these sets of components are also maintained, incrementally and consistently. These representations are then used to directly compose the next level representation of the reached state that is put into the hash-table.
Ensuring Consistency -Incrementally
The compaction infrastructure, equipped with the necessary compaction information, views the state space of the system as a multi-dimensional array (with one dimension for every component of the system), and consequently, every state as a point in this multi-dimensional space. Another representation used is a column-major linearisation of this multi-dimensional array.
Since, as also is the case with the State-of-SPIN, the number of components that compose the system-state can increase (if new processes or queues are added) and decrease (if the last process reaches the end of its computation), the compaction infrastructure has to also recompute its mapping from the multi-dimensional array to a linearised representation. Only the column-major linearisation is useful as the row-major linearisation cannot handle varying numbers of processes. The compaction algorithm, therefore, associates a weight along with every component of the state-of-EASN at the point of installing it and uses this weight to appropriately increase or decrease the impact of the change in the value of this component on the linearised representation. We assume here that the system comprises of components numbered from 0 through n, and we use the prime notation to denote the new value of any entity. Whenever the system moves from one state to another, only those few state components that are responsible for the change determine the update on the linearised representation. The compaction infrastructure updates the representation incrementally which is then stored into the hash-store when an exhaustive search is conducted.
Incremental Hashing
There are functions in SPIN-generated pan.c, called d hash, r hash and s hash, that generate (1 or 2) 32-bit hash values by using the complete octet-string (representing a part or the full state) that has been passed to them. SPIN generated validators use these functions to compute hash values corresponding to reached states represented by now. The user can specify any of a set of 32 hash constants to be used by these algorithms. Typically, only a few of the components of the system are responsible for its change in state at any given point in its evolution. Hence, an incremental computation of the hash value can improve performance which is done through our compaction infrastructure.
SPIN uses polynomial arithmetic to compute a 32-bit intermediate quantity (that is further used to generate the hash-values), by performing a fast division operation on the now state vector using the chosen (32-bit) hash constant as the divisor. In EASN, we use integer division on the linearised representation of the reached state, again using the 32-bit hash constant. The 32-bit remainder, thus generated, is used to generate the hash values, just as they are in SPIN.
We introduce another attribute maintained for every system component: r j = w j mod H: remainder after dividing its weight by the hash constant, H.
Below, we discuss the incremental computation to generate this hash-value R´for a new state that resulted with a change in the system component j, given that the hash-value for the old system state was R.
Notice that in the context of the lsvcomp implementation, all the four quantities on the RHS of the equation above, namely, R, r j , δi j , and H, are all 32-bit operands. This allows for an efficient implementation of this incremental hashvalue computation.
More interestingly, under certain combination of SPIN options (-DBITSTATE & -DSAFETY) while compiling the validator, it turns out that the linearised version of the state is neither stored on the stack nor in the hashtable, which reduces the burden of generating, computing and maintaining it, since we can generate the hash values corresponding to the reached state incrementally, directly available from the compaction infrastructure.
However, this incremental hash-value computation scheme requires the value H to be identified at compile time itself, since it is used by the constructors in the compaction infrastructure, which could be called before main. This is in contrast with SPIN generated validators, which can be compiled once and then executed many times for various values of H.
Correctness of Implementation vis-a-vis SPIN
In deriving an EASN implementation from SPIN sources (given the above indicated modifications), we identified the following invariant that could be a necessary and sufficient condition to convince oneself that neither the simulator engine of EASN, nor the state-space exploration engine of the generated validator gives different results than SPIN:
Given a Promela spec. s and a cEASN spec. e, derived from s by changing all its variable types to equivalent ASN.1 types (defined in an associated ASN.1 module, appropriately imported into EASN): A. Simulation runs of SPIN over s and of EASN over e should show identical selection sequence of state-transitions, for the same seed value; B. The sequence in which the reachable states of the system are visited by the generated validators (by SPIN for s and by EASN for e) must be identical (for exhaustive state-space searches), with/without partial-order reduction, never-claims, and irrespective of other switches like safety, fairness, statecompaction mechanisms, etc.
EASN preserves this invariant for all the test cases we have tried (as per Test/README.tests). This gives us reason to believe that in the process of crafting an EASN system from SPIN, the most critical components of it are reasonably sane and stable. To that extent we do well in inheriting the timetested aspect of SPIN. 
Results and Conclusions
We have used EASN to validate a simplified RLC protocol in the W-CDMA stack. It has a smaller state than SPIN due to the use of the subtyping information by the state compaction infrastructure. Further details of the performance of EASN will be submitted to the FMICS workshop. Due to its length, we present a much simpler ABP protocol in figure 2. Note that the state vector for EASN is half the size of SPIN's.
Performance of EASN vs SPIN
We present some preliminary performance comparisons of EASN-generated validators for specs derived from some Promela specs (snoopy and leader election) in the SPIN/Test database, with those generated by SPIN (table 1) . We compare the runs of the validators generated by both SPIN and EASN, under compilations with three sets of options, SAFETY, SAFETY and NOREDUCE, SAFETY, NOREDUCE and BITSTATE. Time is in seconds, memory in megabytes, the State(-vector) size in bytes and the last column lists the size of pan in Kilobytes. Since we have made only the minimal modifications to a Promela spec to derive the corresponding cEASN spec, we expect to see (except for the bitstate runs) the number of states detected and the number of transitions explored must be the same for both the SPIN generated validator and the EASN-generated ones. Note that this is indeed true.
Bytes required to store the linearised State representation are lesser for EASN, than for SPIN, also as expected, thereby reducing run-time memory usage, again except for the bitstate runs, where both the validators use the same number of bits to store a single state. (The reduction in memory is much lower than expected, since, we believe we still have some unplugged memory leaks in our generated validators). The Table reads 0 for EASN bitstate runs indicating incremental hash-value computation, as described in section 4.4.
Also as expected, our run-time is higher than for SPIN-generated validators. However, the increase is many-fold, being much higher than what we anticipated. Profiling has revealed the following major contributing factors. C++: In SPIN, an integer variable in the Promela spec translates to an integer member of a C structure, and access to it is not protected, unlike in EASN, where that compares to an asn::Integer object, that (typically) encapsulates the actual integer (that holds the value of interest), as a private/protected member. Therefore, any Promela expression that involves use of this integer object, translates into a C++ member function call (that may or may not be inlined).
C++ Constructors and Destructors:
We observe a substantial portion of run-time spent initialising and destroying temporary C++ objects on the stack. Since we wanted to prevent having to incur time penalties related to allocating and deallocating objects on the heap, our generated code uses compiler temporaries, but even then one cannot avoid the constructor/destructor cost that is implied by the ASN.1/C++ run-time support system. Integer Arithmetic, instead of Polynomial Arithmetic: Time is also consumed in routines that have to do multi-precision arithmetic operations, like addition, multiplication and modulus. SPIN scores a big plus on this aspect since it uses cheaper polynomial division operations in its hash functions. Although our choice of the integer arithmetic enables us to implement the hashing algorithm incrementally, it would be much faster if we could find another lower cost mapping from our full-blown C++ version of the State-of-EASN to some linearised representation that also enables us to compute the latter from the former incrementally, like we can now. Huge Executables: The generated validators usually make very few system calls, but due to the very large (compared to the size of the SPIN-generated validators) size of our validators, we see much higher system activity in our runs, as compared to that in the case of SPIN validators.
We have also attempted to see how EASN compares with SPIN with a change in the problem size ( Table 2 ).Note that as the size of the system being validated is increased, the memory benefit of EASN's more compact state-vector begins to show, and also, as the SPIN state-vector size grows larger, the run-time cost of handling the same begins to reduce the gap between the two validators' performance. The sort program from the Test database has N instances of the middle proctype in the system, each reading from and writing into its left and right channels respectively. The system also has N channels. Increasing N, therefore, increases the size of the system being analysed. 
Future Work
There are mainly two lines of activity, we believe, that can be pursued to get better results than are possible by further cleaning up our implementation of any wasteful handling of either memory and/or time, when executing the validator.
-Since only the simulator requires the generic interface capability, generating C-source for the validator would better its performance. Since the ASN.1/C binding is lighter, we would still get the benefit of having type information available from ASN.1, while reducing of our run-time cost. The subtype information would continue to be available. The EASN language definition would still be the starting point for the tool which continues to work with the ASN.1/C++ bindings, but uses the ASN.1/C binding for the validator. -Study ways of reducing the cost of multi-precision arithmetic.
